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1 Introduction 
Insurance markets are proving to be a fruitful area for empirical work on contract theory.  
Since much of the theoretical work on contracts is motivated by moral hazard and adverse 
selection, insurance seems a natural product on which to study the impact that private 
information and unobservable actions have on contract terms and performance.  While 
several theoretical papers incorporate repeated contracting over time (see Chiappori, 2000, 
for a review), empirical research has yet to fully address the repeated nature of insurance 
contracting (Chiappori and Heckman, 2002, and Cohen, 2002, are exceptions). Many 
insurance purchases are quite persistent over time (Nini, 2004, documents significant 
persistence in auto insurance).  With short-term contracts and repeated interactions, ex-post 
moral hazard becomes important as consumers have strategic incentives to prevent the 
revelation of potentially costly information.  This is particularly true for drivers involved in a 
auto accident: making a claim provides valuable indemnification yet reveals information that 
may lead to future premium increases.  
A unique contract feature in Australian auto insurance provides an opportunity to 
identify the importance of ex-post behavior (after an accident happens but before the claim 
is paid) in insurance markets.  Australian auto insurance is partly experienced rated, meaning 
that claims where the insured is determined to be “at-fault” have an explicit impact on future 
premiums.  Insureds who have an accident are faced with the common tradeoff of reporting 
the claim and being indemnified or not reporting the claim and saving future premiums.  
Importantly, insureds reaching the top rating class are given the option to purchase “Rating 
Protection” against making an at-fault claim.  In exchange for a premium, insureds can make 
a single at-fault claim without facing subsequent premium increases.  Roughly one-quarter of 
the sample population chooses this option, and this paper examines differences in claims 
outcomes for these two groups of insurance customers.  
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The first contribution of this paper is to identify an example where additional insurance 
leads to a marked change in outcomes.  Insureds purchasing this Rating Protection have 
significantly more claims than insureds not purchasing the protection.  This result is 
important since prior research has frequently found at most a small relationship between the 
amount of insurance purchased (e.g. the size of a deductible) and the probability of a claim.  
Finding that insureds respond to the incentives provided by contracts restores some 
credibility to the rationality of the consumer and our economic models used understand 
behavior.    
The more noteworthy contribution of the paper is to document that the significant 
difference in outcomes appears principally attributable to actions taken after an accident 
occurs.  The data suggest that insureds frequently choose not to make claims for accidents 
that happen, but this effect is muted by the purchase of Rating Protection.  While the 
positive correlation between Rating Protection and claim frequency is consistent with both 
adverse selection and ex-ante moral hazard, the empirical results suggest that the driving 
force for the difference in claim frequency is that insureds without Rating Protection are 
considerably more likely to hide their accident and not make a claim on the policy.  Such 
behavior is a rational response to the incentives provided by the experience rating system 
used in Australia.  The lack of significant evidence of ex-ante moral hazard or adverse 
selection is consistent with prior literature on auto insurance that fails to find a positive 
correlation between claims and the amount of insurance after controlling for observable 
rating variables.  
The impact of under-reporting is first identified by a series of reduced form comparisons 
of the claim severity distributions and the claim type (at-fault vs. no fault) distributions for 
insured with and without Rating Protection.  Regression results suggest that policies with 
Rating Protection have significantly smaller claims on average than policies without 
protection, consistent with policies having Rating Protection having additional small claims.  
This conclusion is supported by Probit regressions that estimate the likelihood that a policy 
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has a claim of a particular size.  The results suggest that policies with Rating Protection are 
more likely to have small claims (under A$1,000) but no less likely to have large claims 
(greater than A$5,000).  Moreover, non-parametric estimates of the conditional severity 
distributions confirm the intuition that the differences in average claim amounts is driven by 
more mass in the left tail of the distribution for policies with Rating Protection.  Simply, the 
data indicate that policies without Rating Protection seem to have fewer small claims than 
comparable policies with Rating Protection. 
Furthermore, the distributional differences are strongest for claims classified as at-fault 
by the insurance company.  Conditional on a claim occurring, policies with Rating 
Protection are much more likely to have an at-fault claim, and the severity differences are 
not evident for no fault claims.  Combined, the evidence suggests that the observed 
differences in outcomes are due to significantly more under-reporting by policies without 
Rating Protection.  
In order to explore the implication of under-reporting further, an econometric model of 
accident frequency and claiming behavior is specified.  The observed claim distribution is 
assumed to be a censored version of the unobservable accident distribution, where the 
censoring happens stochastically (as in Nelson, 1977).  Insureds are assumed to have an 
unobservable, stochastic threshold below which accidents will not be reported.  
Consequently, the insurance company only receives claims that are larger than this 
threshold.  The observed mean claim severity is larger than the underlying mean accident 
severity, and the observed mean claim frequency is less than the underlying mean accident 
frequency.  The unobserved threshold is permitted to vary with the status of Rating 
Protection, allowing identification of the effect that Rating Protection has on accident 
frequency, accident severity, and the claiming threshold.    
The econometric results suggest that the large increase in claim frequency is driven by 
policies with Rating Protection having a much lower claiming threshold and slightly larger 
accident frequency.  Policies without Rating Protection engage in significant under-
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reporting, which results in low claim frequency rates and high average claim severity relative 
to policies without Protection, who fail to report only the smallest of claims.  Incorporating 
the effect of under-reporting explains over 80 percent of the difference in observed claim 
frequency and all of the difference in average claim severity.  The remaining difference in 
claim frequency may be attributable to ex-ante moral hazard and/or adverse selection.  
However, the remaining effect is economically small, especially relative to the impact of ex-
post moral hazard. 
Section 2 outlines the insurance system in Australia, concentrating on the unique system 
for setting premiums and option to buy Rating Protection.  Section 3 provides pure reduced 
form results suggesting that under-reporting of small at-fault claims is quite prevalent for 
insureds without Rating Protection.  Section 4 provides a more structural model to uncover 
the distribution of accident frequency and severity using the observed distribution of claim 
frequency and severity.  Section 5 concludes.   
2 Australian Auto Insurance and Data 
2.1 Australian Auto Insurance 
In Australia, insurance protection for automobile related accidents is provided similarly 
to many European countries.  Coverage is separated into first-party and third-party coverage. 
The third-party coverage insures a driver against liability created by an at-fault accident that 
damages another person’s property.  This coverage is mandatory for all drivers and is 
provided under a highly regulated pricing scheme.  The first-party coverage is optional and 
typically purchased through a comprehensive policy.  Comprehensive coverage insures a 
driver against loss from damage to the driver’s own car resulting from accident, theft, fire, 
and various other perils.  
First-party coverage is priced in a two-stage procedure that adjusts premiums based on 
the primary driver’s rating class and claims experience.  A driver’s rating class is a function of 
a set of characteristics related to the driver and the automobile.  Among many, the 
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characteristics include the age and gender of the driver, the make and model of the car, and 
the location where the car is garaged.  A base premium is offered as a function of the rating 
class.  The final premium is determined by applying a no claims discount (NCD) to the base 
premium, where the NCD is an insured specific rating determined by the insured’s claim 
history.  All drivers enter the system as a rating 6 and move up or down according to their 
claim experience.  A year without a claim results in a one step improvement in rating (down 
in the scale), while a claim will result in a two step increase.1  Compared with rating 6, rating 
5 offers a 20 percent premium discount, and each additional step provides an additional 10 
percent reduction.  Rating 1 drivers receive a 60 percent reduction from the base premium.  
Insureds have various contract choices that also affect final premiums.  An optional 
excess (deductible) of A$400 is available, which most insureds choose in order to reduce 
their premiums.  An agreed value endorsement provides coverage up to a pre-specified 
amount, rather than the market value of the car at time of loss.  Other features are available, 
but they are typically chosen by only a small portion of the insured population. 
Most importantly for this study, insureds reaching the top NCD rating (level 1) have the 
option to purchase Rating Protection that will protect the high rating and corresponding 
premium discount against one claim that would otherwise cause the rating to increase. 
Insureds pay an additional premium for this coverage.  Moreover, after retaining the top 
rating for three years without a claim, this coverage is given to all insureds at no additional 
cost.  Insureds with Rating Protection are permitted to make a single at-fault claim without 
losing their rating 1 status, although a claim does reset the clock measuring time until free 
Rating Protection is granted. 
2.2 Dataset 
The dataset is a large cross-section of policies from a single Australian insurance 
company.   The original set is comprised of all comprehensive policies in effect during the 
                                                 
1 As will be discussed later, not all claims are treated equally.  In general, only at-fault claims result in a 
NCD rating decrease.  
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year July 1, 1996 through June 30, 1997.  All policies in-force during this year are included in 
the sample, with in-force policies being active at least some point during the year.  The 
longest policy is one year, so policy have inception dates as early as July 1, 1995 and as late as 
June 30, 1997.  Claims related to these policies are recorded only if they happen during the 
period July 1, 1996 through June 30, 1997.  The data includes the inception date of the 
policy, so all statistics and econometric tests incorporate the number of days of exposure that 
the policy is active during the accident period.  
Several initial restrictions are made to produce a more homogeneous sample.  Only 
vehicles intended for private use by an individual family are included in the data.  This 
restriction excludes vehicles intended primarily for commercial use by a business.  The 
sample also excludes all leased vehicles, which leaves only vehicles fully owned or privately 
financed.  In Australia, automobile insurance policies have a mandatory excess in addition to 
the optional A$400 excess.  The sample is restricted to all policies with no mandatory excess 
and $400 voluntary excess.2   
For each policy, the data includes the set of observable variables used to construct rating 
classes.  These variables include common characteristics know to affect the insurance claim 
distribution and are separated into variables related to the insured driver and variables 
related to the insured automobile.  The variables include the age and gender of the primary 
driver, the primary location of the insured driver, the age and value of the insured 
automobile, and several other variables related to the crashworthiness of the automobile.  
Table 2 provides a list and brief description of each variable. 
The sample is trimmed based on outliers of the continuous variables in the data.  The top 
and bottom 1 percent of the sample is dropped based on the sample percentiles of the 
continuous variables.  Results are qualitatively robust to the exclusion but the quadratic 
functional forms imposed in the models are more appropriate for the trimmed data.  
                                                 
2 This restriction removes a potential source of moral hazard and/or adverse selection. 
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The data also includes various variables related to the details of the particular policy.  
Most relevant for the study here, the data includes an indicator that the policyholder 
purchased Rating Protection.  The data also provide the total number of claims made on the 
policy during the accident period, the total amount of claim payments made related to the 
claims, and a simple categorization of the type of claim.  The claim categories indicate 
whether the claim was determined to be ‘at-fault’ or not.  An at-fault claim would result in a 
reduced NCD rating, at least in the absence of Rating Protection.  In general, at-fault claims 
include multiple car accidents where the driver is at least partly to blame (e.g. “insured rear-
ended a third party”) and all single car accidents regardless of blame where the offender is 
unknown (e.g. “car damaged while parked”).       
3 Rating Protection and Under-Reporting 
Obviously, the premium rating scheme provides incentives for insureds to reduce the 
number of claims reported to the insurance company.  Since car accidents are generally 
unobservable to the insurance company, insureds can reduce claims by simply not reporting 
accidents to the insurer.  The cost of not reporting is the forgone indemnification promised 
by the policy, and the benefit is that the insured maintains the higher rating.  As a result, 
under-reporting should be more prevalent for smaller claims and at-fault claims.  
3.1 Unconditional Comparison 
Roughly one-quarter of the sample has Rating Protection, and the fraction choosing 
protection increases with the number of years the insured has a rating 1.  Table 1 reports 
sample summary statistics for insureds with and without Rating Protection.  Across the 
entire sample, policies generate claims with frequency about 9.4 percent per year.  However, 
insureds without Rating Protection have a sample claim frequency of 8.5 percent, and 
insureds with Rating Protection have a sample frequency of 11.8 percent.  This 38 percent 
increase in claim frequency is statistically different from zero and quite meaningful 
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economically.  As will be seen shortly, no other variables have such a large effect on claim 
frequency.   
The lower part of Table 1 presents some summary statistics about the nature of claims 
across the two categories.  Note that the share of claims considered ‘at-fault’ is larger for 
policies with Rating Protection.  Across the whole sample, the fraction of at-fault claims rises 
from 63.2 percent to 68.7 percent, which is a statistically significant 8.6 percent (5.5 
percentage points) increase in the share of at-fault claims.3  Since only at-fault claims affect 
the insured’s rating, the incentive to under-report is strongest for these claims, and the 
evidence suggests that insureds without Rating Protection report less at-fault claims.   
The bottom three rows present the sample mean, median, and standard deviation of claim 
payments.  Across the whole sample, policies without Rating Protection have an average 
claim of A$3,727, and policies with Rating Protection have an average claim of only A$3,048.  
The mean difference of $679 (18.2 percent) is significantly different from zero at 
conventional significance levels.  Since the cost of not reporting an accident to the insurance 
company is the forgone indemnification, insureds have more incentive not to report for 
smaller claim sizes.  Consistent with this, policies without Rating Protection have higher 
average claim costs.  
In total, the initial evidence strongly suggests that policies with Rating Protection have 
significantly more claims, significantly more ‘at-fault’ claims, and significantly lower average 
claim costs.  All of these results are consistent with under-reporting of smaller, at-fault 
claims by insureds without protection.  As a final note, the large increase in claim frequency 
dominates the decrease in conditional claim severity so that the sample mean unconditional 
cost of claims is significantly larger for policies with Rating Protection.  Across the whole 
sample, policies without protection have mean claim costs of A$319, while policies with 
Rating Protection have mean claim costs of A$360.       
                                                 
3 The percent of at-fault claims is larger than 50 percent because single car accidents are considered ‘at-
fault’. 
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3.2 Initial Regression Results 
One potential explanation for the observed differences in outcomes is observable 
differences in rating classes across the two groups.  Tables 3, 4, and 5 present regression 
results analogous to the summary statistics above.  All regressions use a set of observable 
explanatory variables constructed from the variables in Table 2.  All continuous explanatory 
variables are standardized by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the sample 
standard deviation.  Both a linear and a quadratic term are included for all continuous 
variables.  Seven of the eight DISTRICT dummy variables are used in all regressions.   
Table 3 provides the estimation results for a claim frequency and claim severity model.  
The claim frequency model is a probit model where the dependent variable is the number of 
claims per day.  The estimation assumes that the probability of a claim in a single day is 
constant across days and captured by ( )' XβΦ  , where ( )Φ ⋅   is the standard normal CDF.  
The claim severity model is an OLS model where the dependent variable is the log of the 
reported claim amount, conditional on the claim being classified as ‘at-fault’.  All 4,725 at-
fault claims are included in the sample.   
The results confirm the expectation that the explanatory variables do help explain the 
distributions of claim frequency and claim severity.  However, the effect of Rating Protection 
remains quite strong.  In the frequency regression, the coefficients on RATING 
PROTECTION are all positive and significantly different from zero.  Moreover, Rating 
Protection increases claim frequency by roughly 3 percentage points across the three years of 
rating 1, which is an economically significant increase.  Similarly, the coefficients on 
RATING PROTECTION are all negative and significant in the claim severity regression.  
Policies with RATING PROTECTION have claims that are roughly A$1,000 smaller on 
average than policies without Rating Protection.   
Table 4 provides estimation results for a model of the probability that a claim is classified 
as at-fault.  All reported claims are included in the regression, and the dependent variable is 
an indicator that the claim is at-fault.  While the at-fault likelihood of a particular claim is 
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related to some of the explanatory variables, the effect of Rating Protection remains quite 
strong.  The point estimates suggest that the increase is roughly 5 percentage points for 
policies in their first or second year of rating 1 and nearly 10 percentage points for policies in 
their third year.  
Finally, Table 5 presents two probit models for the likelihood that a particular claim is of 
a certain size.  The first model uses all claims, and the dependent variable is an indicator that 
the claim is less than A$1,000.  The second model uses all claims greater than A$1,000, and 
the dependent variable is an indicator that the claim is greater than A$5,000.  In both 
models, few of the explanatory variables significantly affect the probability of a small claim 
or the conditional probability of a large claim.  The notable exception is the presence of 
Rating Protection.  The results of the first model suggest that Rating Protection roughly 
doubles the likelihood that a particular claim is below A$1,000.  However, Rating Protection 
is not significantly related to the conditional probability that a claim is above A$5,000.  The 
coefficients are negative, but they insignificantly different from zero and relatively small in 
magnitude.  The combined results strongly suggest that the reduction in average claim 
severity for policies with Rating Protection is driven by a relative increase in the number of 
small claims.     
As final corroborating evidence, Figure 1 plots the residuals from the claim severity 
regression presented in Table 3.  The regression includes a dummy variable indicating that 
the policy has Rating Protection, so the sample mean of residuals conditional on Rating 
Protection is zero.  However, the shape of the conditional residual distribution provides 
evidence about the nature of the underlying claims distribution.  To that end, the Figure 1 
provides a histogram and fitted kernel distribution for the residuals conditional on Rating 
Protection.  Two differences are noticeable.  First, the claims distribution for policies with 
Rating Protection has higher variance.  Second, the claims distribution for policies with 
Rating Protection is more left-skewed than the distribution for policies without Rating 
Protection.  When controlling for both Rating Protection and the number of years with 
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rating 1, the differences in variance and skewness are significantly different from zero at a 5 
percent level.  Again, these results are consistent with under-reporting by insureds without 
Rating Protection, which generates the differences in skewness.  The next section provides a 
more general model that can generate such observable differences. 
4 A Model of Claiming 
4.1 Econometric Set-Up 
The goal is to generate consistent estimates of the effect that Rating Protection has on the 
unobserved accident frequency and severity distribution, using only information in the 
observed claim frequency and severity distributions.  With under-reporting of accidents, the 
observed claim distribution is a censored version of the accident distribution.  The Nelson 
(1977) model of censoring with an unobserved, random threshold provides a natural model 
for the observed claim distribution.  Dionne and Gagne (2000) use this model for insurance 
claim payments and find evidence of significant under-reporting.  The modeling 
contribution here is to permit under-reporting to affect both the observed severity and 
frequency distributions.   
Suppose the probability of an accident occurring on any given day is given by Ap .  The 
probability Ap  is modeled as in a standard probit model, ( )'A Ap Xβ= Φ , where ( )Φ •  is a 
standard normal CDF, X  is a vector of explanatory variables, and Aβ  is a vector of 
coefficients.  In a given span of  d  days, the probability of no accident occurring is ( )1 dAp− , 
and the probability of an accident occurring is ( )1 1 dAp− − , denoted ( )dpA .   
Conditional on an accident occurring, the unobserved severity of the accident is 
determined by a draw from a lognormal distribution, ( ) ( )SS XS σβ ,N~ln ' , where Sβ  is a 
vector of severity coefficients, and Sσ  is the standard deviation of the log of the accident 
amount.  The log-normality assumption is imposed because first-party auto claims do not 
have fat tails and the distribution has proved to fit the data before (Kofman and La, 1998).  
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Finally, each insured is assumed to have an unobservable threshold below which accidents 
will not be reported.  The threshold is modeled as a draw from a lognormal distribution, 
( ) ( )TT XT σβ ,N~ln ' , where Tβ  is a vector of severity coefficients, and Tσ  is the standard 
deviation of the log of insureds’ thresholds.  Random variables S  and T  are permitted to 
have non-zero correlation, but both are assumed independent of A .   
The observed data is the couple ( )CIC , , where CI  is an indicator that the policy had a 
claim payment, and C  is the total claim payments made on the policy.  Since a claim is 
reported if and only if it is larger than the threshold, we have the following model for the 
observed data: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )⎩
⎨
⎧
<==
≤==
=
CTCSAC
TSAA
CIC  and  and 1 if,1
 and 1or  0 if0,0
,  
The probability of the observed data can be written as a function of the distributions of the 
underlying fundamental random variables ( )TSA ,, .   
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]TSCSACCI
TSAACI
C
C
>=⋅===
≤⋅=+===
|lnlnPr1Pr,1,Pr
Pr1Pr0Pr0,0,Pr
           (1) 
First, given the independence of A , the observed claim severity distribution can be derived 
as in Maddalla (1983): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
Pr ln ln , ln ln
Pr ln | 1
Pr ln ln
Pr ln ln Pr ln ln | ln ln
Pr ln ln
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S C S T
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S T
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= ⋅ < =⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦=
>⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 
The denominator is the unconditional probability that an accident is larger than the insured’s 
threshold.  By the normality assumption ( ) ( )ST lnln −  is distributed normally with mean 
( ) XST 'ββ −  and variance STST σσσ −+ 22 , and the probability in the denominator is given by 
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The unconditional probability that an accident happens but is not reported is given by 1 
minus the unconditional probability that an accident is larger than the threshold: 
( ) ( )
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−+
−
Φ−=≤
STST
TS XTS
σσσ
ββ
22
'
1Pr .                         (3) 
Finally, using ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]dAA XdpA '111Pr βΦ−−=== , all the components of (1) are 
specified and the log-likelihood of a particular observation is given by: 
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Maximum likelihood estimation results in estimates of the parameters Aβ , Sβ , and Tβ , 
including parameter estimates on the variables related to Rating Protection.    
4.2 Results 
Table 6 provides the maximum likelihood estimates of the model presented above.  
Estimation uses the entire sample of 176,913 observations, and the likelihood function is 
maximized using the Newton-Raphson method with numerical derivatives.  Starting values 
for the accident severity and accident frequency coefficients are taken from the simpler 
models presented in Table 3.  Starting values for the threshold coefficients were all set to 
zero, but results are qualitatively robust to alternative starting values.  All the models include 
dummy variables for 7 of the 8 DISTRICT variables, and the residual standard deviation was 
permitted to vary with the number of years of Rating Protection.  The point estimates 
(standard errors) for the standard deviation of accident severity are .966 (.040), .949 (.036), 
and .926 (.024) for one year, two year, and three years with Rating Protection, respectively.  
Point estimates (standard errors) for the threshold standard deviation are .681 (.128), .649 
(.121), and .620 (.136).  The estimated conditional correlation between accident severity and 
the unobserved threshold is .223, with a standard error of .146, suggesting an unobserved 
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factor that is positively correlated with both accident severity and the unobserved claiming 
threshold.  
The results of the claiming model indicate a significant amount of unreported claims in 
the data.  The unconditional model implied probability of an accident is 9.2 percent, 8.1 
percent, and 7.8 percent for insureds with one year, two years, or three years of the top 
rating.  Table 3 indicated that the comparable claim frequencies are 6.5 percent, 5.8 percent, 
and 5.1 percent.  The difference is due to the censoring of small claims due to under-
reporting.  The estimated threshold coefficients imply an unconditional mean threshold of 
A$865, A$960, and A$1,083, based on the three intercepts.  Given the accident severity 
distribution, such large thresholds result in many claims not being reported.  The estimated 
accident severity coefficients confirm that the claim severity estimates in Table 3 are upward 
biased estimates of accident costs.  The unconditional mean cost of accidents is A$3,487, 
A$3,198, and A$2,918, which are A$375, A$534, and A$705 less than the mean claim costs.  
The increase in the bias is due to censoring being more likely for insureds with a Rating 1 for 
more years.   
Controlling for censoring significantly reduces the impact that Rating Protection has on 
expected accident frequency.  While insureds with Rating Protection have claims roughly 3 
percentage points more often, the coefficient estimates in Table 6 indicate that accidents 
happen only roughly .5 percentage points more often.  While still significantly greater than 
zero, the economic impact is relatively small and dramatically smaller than the impact on 
claims.  The model estimates suggest that over 80 percent of the increase in claims for 
insured with Rating Protection is due to the under-reporting of claims for insureds without 
Rating Protection.   
Figure 2 provides an illustration of the impact that under-reporting has on the resulting 
claims distribution.  Along the horizontal axis is the amount of an accident, chart depicts the 
estimated probability that the claim is not reported to the insurance company.  For insureds 
with Rating Protection, the likelihood of under-reporting falls off very quickly, essentially 
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reaching zero by accidents larger than A$250.  For insureds without Rating Protection, 
however, accidents around A$250 are not reported nearly 60 percent of the time.  Even one-
fifth of accidents costing A$1,000 are not reported.  Given the large mass of the accident 
distribution falling under A$2,000, it is not surprising that insureds with Rating Protection 
have many more claims. 
The estimated coefficients on the remaining variables show several interesting patterns.  
Few of the threshold coefficients are significantly different from zero, so the likelihood of 
claim censoring doesn’t vary much with these other characteristics.  Consequently, the sign 
and size of many of the coefficients in the frequency and severity equations are similar in the 
accident (Table 6) and claiming (Table 3) models.  The amount of insurance (AMT_INSURE) 
and the age of the vehicle (AGE_VEH) are the two exceptions.  The threshold is estimated to 
be negatively related to the amount of insurance and positively related to the age of the 
vehicle.  Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the effects that various levels of AMT_INSURE and 
AGE_VEH have on the probability a claim versus the probability of an accident.  In Figure 3, 
AMT_INSURE reduces the mean threshold, which in turn causes the probability of an 
accident not being reported to fall from over 35 percent to under 15 percent.  The large 
decrease in the under-reporting causes the claim frequency probability to approach the 
accident frequency probability.  For small values of insurance, under-reporting reduces the 
claim probability by over 3.5 percentage points, but for large insurance values, under-
reporting reduces the claim probability by only 1 percentage point.  Similarly, Figure 4 
shows that the likelihood of under-reporting increases significantly with the age of the car, 
from roughly 5 percent for young vehicles to over 20 percent for older vehicles.  
Consequently, the claiming probability shows a much more marked decrease with vehicle 
age than does the accident probability.   
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5 Conclusions 
Empirical work trying to identify adverse selection and moral hazard has had mixed 
results at best, particularly when applied to auto insurance data.  However, empirical 
research suggests that fraud in auto insurance is easily identified and economically 
significant.  The results here suggests that another ex-post action, the under-reporting of 
claims, is also prevalent in insurance markets and deserves further theoretical and empirical 
research.  
The collection of empirical work on information problems indicates that the ability to 
affect outcomes after the resolution of uncertainty is at least as important as ex-ante 
information differences or ex-ante moral hazard.  Perhaps this is not surprising for insurance 
related to infrequently occurring events.  For example, consider the effect of Rating 
Protection on the ex-ante incentives of a driver in the sample considered here.  Driving less 
cautiously may reduce the cost of effort, but the relative benefit is only the expected 
reduction in future premiums due to the Rating Protection.  While the future premium 
reductions may be substantial, it is unlikely that reduced effort will dramatically increase the 
probability of a claim.  Even with a generous 10 percentage point increase in the probability 
of a claim, the expected premium reduction is only one-tenth of the actual premium 
reduction.  This significantly reduces the relative benefit of driving less cautiously and likely 
reduces the impact of ex-ante moral hazard.  Of course, after an accident occurs, the full 
premium reduction is the cost faced by insureds without Rating Protection, providing much 
more incentive to under-report accidents. 
The impact of ex-post moral hazard likely has larger welfare implications for insurance 
related to more productive assets.  When an insured fails to report a claim, the insured loses a 
valuable source of financing to invest in a depreciating asset (e.g. fixing the broken fender on 
a car or repairing a roof damaged by a hurricane).  In the presence of financing frictions, 
under-reporting creates an important negative externality in that the asset remains less 
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productive.  Such effects may be important in the insurance of corporate assets such as plant 
and equipment. 
Ex-post behavior deserves more attention in the theoretical literature on contracting.  
The ability to affect outcomes after the resolution of uncertainty but before payoffs happen is 
likely part of many contracting situations.  Long-term lending agreements are certainly 
signed in anticipation that some uncertainty will be realized before repayment occurs.  To 
the extent that the borrower can affect the likelihood of repayment after resolution of 
uncertainty, an analogous situation of ex-post moral hazard arises.  An understanding of 
optimal contracting in such a situation will further guide our understanding of the contracts 
and outcomes we see in practice.   
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Table 1. Unconditional Comparison of Policies With and Without Rating Protection 
The table provides a descriptive comparison of policies with and without rating protection.  ‘One Year’, ‘Two Years’, and ‘Three 
Years’ indicates the number of years the policyholder has been at the top rating class.  ‘Exposure Years’ is the aggregate number 
of days expressed at an annual frequency.  ‘Claim Frequency’ is the sample average number of claims of claims per year, 
expressed as a percentage.  ‘At-Fault Percentage’ is the sample average share of total claims where the driver faces a rating 
downgrade.  The ‘At-Fault Severity’ sample statistics are conditional on an at-fault claim being made.  
No Rating With Rating No Rating With Rating No Rating With Rating
Protection Protection Protection Protection Protection Protection
Number of Policies 63,100 14,208 40,220 14,941 31,344 13,100
Exposure Years 27,411 6,150 16,998 7,265 13,714 6,122
Claim Frequency (percent) 9.3 13.2 8.2 11.3 7.5 11.0
Number of Claims 2,557 813 1,389 819 1,022 674
At-Fault Percentage (percent) 64.2 70.0 63.7 68.9 60.1 66.9
At-Fault Severity Mean (A$) 3,888 3,271 3,624 3,197 3,446 2,581
At-Fault Severity Median (A$) 2,634 2,061 2,417 1,763 2,345 1,623
At-Fault Severity St Dev (A$) 4,316 3,573 3,584 5,216 3,457 3,117
One Year Two Years Three Years
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Table 2. Conditioning Variables  
The table provides a description and summary statistics for all of the conditioning variables available in the data.  The sample is 
the entire set of 176,913 policies representing 77,760 years of exposure.  The sample has been limited by removing policies falling 
in the upper and lower 1 percent of the distribution of the continuous variables.  ‘Std’ represents that sample standard deviation.  
Variable Description Mean Std Min Max
Driver Characteristics
AGE_INS Age of primary driver at inception of policy. 41.4 13.4 24.0 80.0
DISTRICT Aggregation of geographic postal codes defined by insurer.
FEMALE Indicates primary driver is a female. 0.45
FINANCED Indicates privately financed vehicle, with alternative a fully owned vehicle. 0.11
AGE_POL Consecutive number of years the policy has been in force with the insurer. 2.0 2.5 0.0 13.0
Automobile Characterisitc
ENGSIZE Engine size, in thousands of cubic cylinders. 2.6 1.0 1.2 5.0
CATPTS Measure of the crash worthiness of the vehicle. (Higher is more expensive.) 10.2 3.5 3.0 24.0
AMT_INSURE Value, in A$10,000, of the automobile. 1.1 0.8 0.2 4.7
AGE_VEH Age, in years, of vehicle at policy issuance. 8.9 4.9 1.0 25.0
Policy Characteristics
DAYS Number of days the policy was in force during the accident period. 160 102 1 365
PREMIUM Total premium charged on the policy. 419 118 179 918
8 Dummy Variables
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Table 3. At-Fault Claim Frequency and Claim Severity Regressions 
The table provides the estimation results for a claim frequency and claim severity model.  
The claim frequency model is a probit model where the dependent variable is the number of 
at-fault claims per day.  The estimation assumes that the probability of a claim in a single day 
is constant across days and captured by ( )' XβΦ , where ( )Φ •  is the standard normal CDF.  
The sample has 176,913 observations representing over 28 million days.  The model is 
estimated by maximum likelihood, and estimated standard errors are in parentheses.  ‘**’ (‘*’) 
indicates coefficients significantly different from zero at a 1 (5) percent confidence level.  All 
continuous explanatory variables are standardized by subtracting the sample mean and 
dividing by the sample standard deviation.  7 of the 8 DISTRICT dummy variables are 
included.  The ‘Estimated Probability’ column reports the model implied probability of a 
claim in a year.  For the intercepts, the predicted values assume all other variables are zero.  
For the three Rating Protection variables, the predicted values use the estimated coefficient 
plus the appropriate intercept.  The other two indicator variables use the ONE YEAR 
INTERCEPT without rating protection.  For the continuous variables, the ‘Minus 1’ (‘Plus 1’) 
column shows the predicted values for a one standard deviation decrease (increase) in the 
variable relative to the mean, again using the ONE YEAR INTERCEPT without rating 
protection.  The continuous variable predicted values incorporate both the linear and 
quadratic effects.      
The claim severity model is an OLS model where the dependent variable is the log of the 
reported claim amount, conditional on the claim being classified as ‘at-fault’.  All 4,725 at-
fault claims are included in the sample.  The regression has an R-squared of .43.  The 
‘Estimated $A’ columns show expected claim severity amounts computed analogously to the 
predicted values from the claim frequency model.  The predicted values use the estimated 
residual variance of 0.91.  
 
 24
Table 3. Initial Claim Frequency and Claim Severity Regressions (continued) 
Minus 1 Plus 1 Minus 1 Plus 1
ONE YEAR INTERCEPT -3.5630 ** 7.923 **
(0.0010) (0.049)
TWO YEARS INTERCEPT -3.5950 ** 7.889 **
(0.0010) (0.052)
THREE YEARS INTERCEPT -3.6258 ** 7.859 **
(0.0011) (0.055)
RATING PROTECTION x ONE YEAR 0.1112 ** 9.7 -0.283 ** 2,910
(0.0009) (0.045)
RATING PROTECTION x TWO YEARS 0.0999 ** 8.3 -0.322 ** 2,798
(0.0010) (0.050)
RATING PROTECTION x THREE YEARS 0.1259 ** 8.2 -0.425 ** 2,525
(0.0011) (0.057)
FEMALE -0.0106 ** 6.2 -0.037 3,721
(0.0008) (0.038)
FEMALE x AGI_INS 0.0202 ** 5.9 7.1 -0.005 4,046 3,685
(0.0004) (0.022)
FEMALE x AGI_INS^2 0.0063 ** -0.042 *
(0.0004) (0.018)
MALE x AGI_INS 0.0200 ** 5.9 7.1 -0.039 * 4,063 3,670
(0.0004) (0.020)
MALE x AGI_INS^2 0.0063 ** -0.012
(0.0003) (0.016)
FINANCED 0.0800 ** 8.7 0.021 3,945
(0.0008) (0.042)
AGE_POL -0.0146 ** 6.8 6.2 -0.030 4,010 3,719
(0.0004) (0.022)
AGE_POL^2 0.0030 ** -0.008
(0.0003) (0.012)
ENGSIZE 0.0100 ** 6.6 6.3 -0.047 * 3,908 3,815
(0.0004) (0.019)
ENGSIZE^2 -0.0156 ** 0.035 *
(0.0004) (0.018)
CATPTS 0.0146 ** 6.1 6.9 0.042 * 3,765 3,960
(0.0003) (0.017)
CATPTS^2 0.0008 ** -0.017
(0.0002) (0.009)
AMT_INSURE 0.0152 ** 6.3 6.7 0.010 3,821 3,902
(0.0007) (0.037)
AMT_INSURE^2 -0.0065 ** 0.001
(0.0002) (0.011)
AGE_VEH -0.0149 ** 7.3 5.7 0.015 3,948 3,777
(0.0006) (0.031)
AGE_VEH^2 -0.0174 ** -0.037 **
(0.0003) (0.014)
Estimated Probability Estimated $A
Coefficient
Claim SeverityClaim Frequency
Probit OLS
3,623
3,732
Coefficient
3,8616.5
5.8
5.1
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Table 4. At-Fault Likelihood Regressions 
The table provides probit estimates for the likelihood of a claim being classified as at-fault.  
The sample includes all 7,274 claims, and the dependent variable is an indicator that the 
claim is at-fault.  The probit model is estimated by maximum likelihood, and standard errors 
are in parentheses.  ‘**’ (‘*’) indicates coefficients significantly different from zero at a 1 (5) 
percent confidence level.  7 of the 8 DISTRICT dummy variables are included.  The ‘Implied 
Probability’ columns reported fitted probabilities computed as in Table 3.  
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Table 4. At-Fault Claim Regressions (continued) 
Minus 1 Plus 1
ONE YEAR INTERCEPT 0.292 **
(0.056)
TWO YEARS INTERCEPT 0.293 **
(0.058)
THREE YEARS INTERCEPT 0.175 **
(0.062)
RATING PROTECTION x ONE YEAR 0.169 ** 67.8
(0.054)
RATING PROTECTION x TWO YEARS 0.138 * 66.7
(0.058)
RATING PROTECTION x THREE YEARS 0.219 ** 65.3
(0.065)
FEMALE 0.042 63.1
(0.044)
FEMALE x AGI_INS 0.133 ** 54.1 68.5
(0.026)
FEMALE x AGI_INS^2 0.057 *
(0.024)
MALE x AGI_INS 0.095 ** 55.2 67.5
(0.023)
MALE x AGI_INS^2 0.066 **
(0.021)
FINANCED 0.145 ** 66.9
(0.050)
AGE_POL -0.050 * 62.4 60.6
(0.025)
AGE_POL^2 0.026
(0.015)
ENGSIZE 0.062 ** 59.1 63.8
(0.022)
ENGSIZE^2 -0.049 *
(0.020)
CATPTS -0.020 61.9 61.1
(0.019)
CATPTS^2 0.009
(0.010)
AMT_INSURE 0.058 60.2 62.8
(0.043)
AMT_INSURE^2 -0.023
(0.013)
AGE_VEH 0.067 59.4 63.5
(0.036)
AGE_VEH^2 -0.014
(0.016)
56.9
61.5
Coefficient
Probit Implied Probability
61.5
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Table 5. At-Fault Severity Regressions 
The table provides probit estimates for two percentiles of the claim severity distribution.  
The ‘Small Claim Likelihood’ model includes all 4,725 at-fault claims, and the dependent 
variable is an indicator that the claim is less than A$1,000.  The probit model is estimated by 
maximum likelihood, and standard errors are in parentheses.  ‘**’ (‘*’) indicates coefficients 
significantly different from zero at a 1 (5) percent confidence level.  The ‘Conditional Large 
Claim Likelihood’ model includes only the 3,844 claims larger than A$1,000, and the 
dependent variable is an indicator that the claim is larger than A$5,000.  7 of the 8 
DISTRICT dummy variables are included.  The ‘Implied Probability’ columns reported fitted 
probabilities computed as in Table 3.  
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Table 5. Severity Percentile Regressions (continued) 
Minus 1 Plus 1 Minus 1 Plus 1
ONE YEAR INTERCEPT -1.063 ** -0.508 **
(0.081) (0.083)
TWO YEARS INTERCEPT -1.097 ** -0.615 **
(0.086) (0.086)
THREE YEARS INTERCEPT -1.077 ** -0.655 **
(0.092) (0.092)
RATING PROTECTION x ONE Y 0.407 ** 25.6 -0.074 28.0
(0.071) (0.076)
RATING PROTECTION x TWO Y 0.548 ** 29.2 -0.031 25.9
(0.078) (0.087)
RATING PROTECTION x THREE 0.605 ** 31.8 -0.165 20.6
(0.089) (0.105)
FEMALE 0.059 15.8 0.008 30.9
(0.061) (0.063)
FEMALE x AGI_INS 0.053 12.2 16.8 0.087 * 27.8 33.5
(0.035) (0.038)
FEMALE x AGI_INS^2 0.048 -0.005
(0.029) (0.031)
MALE x AGI_INS 0.096 ** 12.4 16.7 -0.001 31.2 30.0
(0.033) (0.032)
MALE x AGI_INS^2 -0.001 -0.017
(0.026) (0.027)
FINANCED -0.063 13.0 0.035 31.8
(0.070) (0.069)
AGE_POL 0.048 13.2 15.6 -0.017 31.6 29.6
(0.036) (0.037)
AGE_POL^2 0.004 -0.013
(0.019) (0.023)
ENGSIZE 0.057 13.9 14.9 -0.004 31.8 29.4
(0.031) (0.032)
ENGSIZE^2 -0.033 -0.031
(0.029) (0.031)
CATPTS -0.068 * 15.9 13.0 0.019 30.2 30.9
(0.027) (0.028)
CATPTS^2 0.003 -0.008
(0.015) (0.015)
AMT_INSURE 0.064 13.4 15.4 0.030 30.3 30.8
(0.060) (0.061)
AMT_INSURE^2 -0.021 -0.023
(0.018) (0.019)
AGE_VEH 0.011 13.9 14.9 -0.024 33.9 27.4
(0.050) (0.051)
AGE_VEH^2 0.011 -0.069 **
(0.022) (0.024)
Conditional Large Claim Likelihood
Probit
Coefficient
30.6
26.9
25.6
Implied Probability
14.1
13.6
Coefficient
14.4
Probit
Small Claim Likelihood
Implied Probability
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Table 6. Accident Frequency, Accident Severity, and Claiming Model  
The table provides the maximum likelihood estimates of the model presented in Section 4.  
Estimation uses the entire sample of 176,913 observations.  The likelihood function is 
maximized using the Newton-Raphson method with numerical derivatives.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses.  ‘**’ (‘*’) indicates coefficients significantly different from zero at a 1 (5) 
percent confidence level.  7 of the 8 DISTRICT dummy variables are included.  Point 
estimates (standard errors) for the standard deviation of accident severity are .966 (.040), .949 
(.036), and .926 (.024) for one year, two year, and three years with Rating Protection, 
respectively.  Point estimates (standard errors) for the threshold standard deviation are .681 
(.128), .649 (.121), and .620 (.136).  The estimated conditional correlation between accident 
severity and the unobserved threshold is .223, with a standard error of .146.  
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Table 6. Accident Frequency, Accident Severity, and Claiming Model (continued) 
ONE YEAR INTERCEPT -3.4675 ** 7.690 ** 6.505 **
(0.0010) (0.030) (0.399)
TWO YEARS INTERCEPT -3.5016 ** 7.620 ** 6.700 **
(0.0011) (0.022) (0.330)
THREE YEARS INTERCEPT -3.5122 ** 7.550 ** 6.820 **
(0.0012) (0.018) (0.514)
RATING PROTECTION x ONE YEAR 0.0200 ** 0.035 -1.742 **
(0.0009) 0.145 (0.342)
RATING PROTECTION x TWO YEARS 0.0138 ** 0.020 -1.586 **
(0.0010) 0.099 (0.265)
RATING PROTECTION x THREE YEARS 0.0182 ** 0.015 -1.925 **
(0.0012) 0.119 (0.442)
FEMALE -0.0182 ** 0.043 -0.145
(0.0008) 0.036 (0.106)
FEMALE x AGI_INS 0.0255 ** 0.038 0.139
(0.0005) 0.075 (0.141)
FEMALE x AGI_INS^2 0.0059 ** -0.055 -0.098
(0.0004) 0.048 (0.086)
MALE x AGI_INS 0.0189 ** -0.049 * 0.252
(0.0004) 0.023 (0.186)
MALE x AGI_INS^2 0.0024 ** -0.017 -0.058
(0.0004) 0.077 (0.106)
FINANCED 0.0775 ** 0.027 -0.104
(0.0009) 0.049 (0.588)
AGE_POL -0.0111 ** 0.009 -0.189 *
(0.0005) 0.012 (0.092)
AGE_POL^2 0.0005 * -0.005 0.079
(0.0003) 0.057 (0.094)
ENGSIZE 0.0020 ** -0.049 * 0.033
(0.0004) 0.022 (0.121)
ENGSIZE^2 -0.0025 ** 0.036 * -0.019
(0.0004) 0.020 (0.059)
CATPTS 0.0124 ** 0.066 * 0.037
(0.0004) 0.030 (0.138)
CATPTS^2 0.0004 * -0.010 * -0.034
(0.0002) 0.005 (0.044)
AMT_INSURE 0.0075 ** 0.059 * -0.285 **
(0.0008) 0.032 -(0.119)
AMT_INSURE^2 -0.0020 ** -0.010 * 0.124 *
(0.0002) -0.005 (0.059)
AGE_VEH -0.0025 ** -0.043 0.288 *
(0.0007) 0.027 (0.149)
AGE_VEH^2 -0.0244 ** -0.008 -0.234 *
(0.0003) 0.018 -(0.127)
Threshold
Coefficient
Accident 
Severity
CoefficientCoefficient
Accident 
Frequency
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Figure 1. Severity Regression Residuals 
The figure displays residuals from the claim severity regression presented in Table 3.  The 
grey bars are a histogram of sample residuals and the black shaded area is the CDF of a fitted 
nonparametric kernel density estimate.  The top panel shows residuals from the policies 
without rating protection and the bottom panel shows residuals from policies with rating 
protection.  The regression includes an indicator of rating protection, so the sample mean of 
the residuals is zero for both groups.   
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Figure 2. Fitted Conditional Probabilities of Not-Reporting an Accident 
The charts show fitted probability that a particular accident is not reported to the insurance 
company, based on the model estimates shown in Table 6.  The horizontal axis is the size of 
an accident measured in A$, and the vertical axis is measured in percent.  The estimates are 
based on an insured with Rating 1 for one year and sample mean values for all other 
variables.  The estimated standard deviation of accident severity is .966, and the estimated 
standard deviation of the threshold is .681.  The estimated conditional correlation between 
accident severity and the unobserved threshold is .223.  The effect of rating protection is 
based on the estimated coefficient assuming one year of protection.  
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Figure 2. Fitted Conditional Probabilities of Not-Reporting an Accident (continued) 
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Figure 3. Comparative Statics for Fitted Model – Amount of Insurance (AMT_INSURE) 
The charts show fitted expected values based on the model estimates shown in Table 6.  The 
horizontal axis is measured in units of standard deviations from the mean.  The top panel 
shows the expected accident severity and the expected threshold (measured in A$ on the left 
axis) along with the unconditional probability that an accident is not reported (measured on 
the right axis).  The estimates are based on an insured with Rating 1 for one year, no rating 
protection, and sample mean values for all other variables.  The estimated standard deviation 
of accident severity is .966, and the estimated standard deviation of the threshold is .681.  
The estimated conditional correlation between accident severity and the unobserved 
threshold is .223.  The bottom panel shows the estimated accident probability and the 
estimated claim probability, which is generated as the product of the accident probability 
and one minus the probability of censoring. 
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Figure 3. Comparative Statics for Fitted Model – Amount of Insurance (continued) 
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Figure 4. Comparative Statics for Fitted Model – Age of Vehicle (AGE_VEH) 
The charts show fitted expected values based on the model estimates shown in Table 6.  The 
horizontal axis is measured in units of standard deviations from the mean.  The top panel 
shows the expected accident severity and the expected threshold (measured in A$ on the left 
axis) along with the unconditional probability that an accident is not reported (measured on 
the right axis).  The estimates are based on an insured with Rating 1 for one year, no rating 
protection, and sample mean values for all other variables.  The estimated standard deviation 
of accident severity is .966, and the estimated standard deviation of the threshold is .681.  
The bottom panel shows the estimated accident probability and the estimated claim 
probability, which is generated as the product of the accident probability and one minus the 
probability of censoring. 
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Figure 4. Comparative Statics for Fitted Model – Age of Vehicle (continued) 
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